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Mistaken Payments and the Change of Position Defence: 
Rare Cases and Elegance
Struan Scott*
Introduction
This lecture involves one aspect of the recovery of mistaken payments. 
About three years ago mistaken payments gained prominence in New 
Zealand following a bank error enabling a customer to access 10 million 
dollars.1 The news reports concentrated on the amount involved and the 
hunt for the so-called “runaway millionaires”. The coverage extended 
to mistaken payments generally but largely overlooked was the law’s 
imposition of personal liability upon the recipient of a mistaken payment. 
In some situations the payer may have a property claim2 but in this lecture 
I am considering the recipient’s personal liability to repay.
Few would question that our runaway millionaires should repay 
the bank. But this may not always be the case. Assume I make a claim 
with my insurance company. The claim is paid and I spend the money 
– the Scott family has an overseas holiday, when we were going to stay 
* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Otago. The text of this article is 
my Inaugural Professorial Lecture delivered at the University of Otago, 
7 August 2012 (footnotes added). At the commencement of the Lecture I 
expressed my gratitude and indebtedness to the many people who have 
assisted me in my career, in particular for the assistance and guidance 
of the late Richard Sutton, a former Professor and Dean of this Faculty. I 
encountered Richard as a first-year law student. He introduced me to an 
exciting new world. A few years into my undergraduate legal education 
Richard delivered the FW Guest Memorial Lecture (published as: “Unjust 
Enrichment” (1982) 5 Otago LR 187). At this lecture Richard spoke about 
the emerging principle of unjust enrichment. I was hooked! Despite being 
an advocate of unjust enrichment, Richard was distrustful of theories 
that purport to explain all; for him the law was more complicated, in 
that the application of a legal doctrine in a particular situation is often 
the product of a number of competing principles. Guided by Richard, I 
became fascinated by the interaction of the principle of unjust enrichment 
with other legal principles and concerns. Without Richard’s influence I 
would not have been in a position to deliver this lecture. Special mention 
must also be given to my wife, Lee-Anne, and my son, Tim, for their love 
and understanding, especially when I am preoccupied with work.
1 During April 2009, a customer of a New Zealand bank applied for an 
overdraft. Because of a clerical error the overdraft limit was mistakenly 
entered as $10,000,000. The customer and his partner accessed some of 
these funds and left New Zealand. The customer’s partner returned 
voluntarily to New Zealand and the customer was arrested overseas 
and extradited back to New Zealand. Both were convicted of a number 
of criminal charges.
2 Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd [1981] Ch 105; 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council 
[1996] AC 699 (HL).
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at home! I acted in good faith when I lodged the claim and spent the 
money. The insurance company now informs me that the claim was not 
covered by my policy, that their payment was a mistake, and that they 
want repayment.
Should my good faith and the fact that I no longer have the payment 
excuse me from liability? Hopefully you would say “yes”. If so, your 
intuition may be right. The law recognises that a good faith recipient 
of a mistaken payment, who has spent the money on something they 
would not otherwise done, may have a defence – we call this the change 
of position defence.
To make my example more relevant to the point that I am developing 
in my lecture, assume that while I acted in good faith throughout, I had 
been careless in making my claim – if I had read the insurance policy 
more carefully I would have seen the exclusion clause! These facts raise 
two more questions. First: Is my carelessness a relevant consideration for 
the defence? And if so, what about the insurance company’s carelessness? 
To use legal jargon, such questions are discussed under the heading 
of “relative fault”, or just “fault”. The word “fault” is misleading as it 
may suggest wrongdoing, but in this context fault refers to responsibility 
for actions and I will be associating it with carelessness or negligence. 
The orthodox common law view is that the payer’s carelessness is 
not relevant and, assuming the recipient acts in good faith, so too is any 
carelessness on their part.3 By common law I mean the non-statutory law 
of England, New Zealand and some other Commonwealth countries. 
In contrast, the orthodox US view is that the parties’ carelessness is a 
relevant consideration for the defence.
New Zealand has a statutory change of position defence and our 
courts have held that the parties’ actions are relevant. Our courts have 
also held that a common law change of position defence developed by 
English courts applies, and that the parties’ actions are also relevant to 
its application. Our courts’ extension of relative fault (to use the legal 
jargon) to the common law defence is controversial. The common law 
defence and the New Zealand cases are the focus of my lecture.
The lecture is divided into four parts. In the first part I offer a brief 
glimpse into the law governing the recovery of mistaken payments and 
the common law change of position defence. The material is this part is 
to assist in understanding the controversy. 
The second part involves a consideration of the concept of “relative 
fault”. In the first of the three sections that comprise this part, I consider 
the orthodox US position that the parties’ relative fault is a relevant 
consideration. In the second section I consider the current dominant 
3 It has been suggested that “respective fault in creating the precondition 
for the [subsequent] loss [of the payment] may well be relevant”. See Elise 
Bank and Peter Creighton “The Australian Change of Position Defence” 
(2002) 30 UWAL Rev 208 at 226.
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common law theory explaining recovery for unjust enrichment; it states 
that relative fault is not relevant for a change of position defence. Finally 
in the third section I introduce you to New Zealand’s statutory change 
of position defence. 
The material in the third part focuses upon two controversial New 
Zealand cases – Thomas v Houston Corbett & Co4 and National Bank of 
New Zealand Ltd v Waitaki International Processing (NI) Ltd5 – in which the 
courts have had regard to the parties’ relative fault.6 I believe that these 
cases involve rare fact situations and that courts’ reasoning has been 
misunderstood. In the fourth (and final) part I advance an alternative 
analysis for these cases and suggest why I believe that their consideration 
of relative fault is consistent with common law principles. 
I Background 
The law – mistaken payments: Kelly v Solari
The case of Kelly v Solari7 establishes a key aspect to the common law 
response to a mistaken payment. The payer was a life assurance company. 
It had been careless in checking its records and paid out on a lapsed life 
policy. The deceased’s widow was unaware that the policy had lapsed 
and received the payment in good faith.
The case is important because the appeal court held that the payer’s 
carelessness did not preclude recovery from the widow.8 This has been 
the law since. We do not know if the widow still had the money, but in 
the 1840s this was irrelevant. She was liable to repay the value of money 
received.
In the last quarter or so of the 20th century, common law theorists 
and courts recognised that the law governing the recovery of mistaken 
payments is based upon a principle of unjust enrichment.9 In essence 
this principle provides that in certain situations the law imposes an 
obligation upon the recipient of an enrichment to restore the value 
of the enrichment to the person who conferred it. For the principle to 
apply the recipient must have been enriched; the enrichment must be 
at the expense of another; and the enrichment must have occurred in 
circumstances which the law regards as being “unjust” for the recipient 
to retain the enrichment. Of course, there is fine print that we need not 
4 Thomas v Houston Corbett & Co [1969] NZLR 151 (CA). For an analysis of 
this case see RJ Sutton “Unjust Enrichment” (1982) 5 Otago LR 187.
5 National Bank of New Zealand Ltd v Waitaki International Processing (NI) Ltd 
[1999] 2 NZLR 211 (CA).
6 See also the interesting case of ASB Securities Ltd v Geurts [2005] 1 NZLR 
484 (HC). 
7 Kelly v Solari (1841) 9 M & W 54, 152 ER 24.
8 At 58–59; 26 (The payer may recover “however careless [he] may have 
been, in omitting to use due diligence”, per Baron Parke).
9 Barclays Bank Ltd v W J Simms Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd [1980] 1 QB 677 
provides an early illustration of the impact of the principle of unjust 
enrichment of the development of the law.
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consider tonight. 
Kelly v Solari predates the recognition of unjust enrichment but its 
result is explained by it. The widow was enriched by the payment. This 
was at the payer’s expense. And the payer’s mistaken belief that it was 
contractually liable to make the payment meant that it was legally unjust 
for the widow to retain it.10 
Some of you may have misgivings about the imposition of personal 
liability upon the widow in Kelly v Solari, especially if she had spent the 
payment. But until 1991 the common law imposed personal liability to 
repay irrespective of whether the recipient retained the payment. This 
leads us to the recognition by the House of Lords of a common law 
change of position defence. 
The common law change of position defence: Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale 
Ltd 
The facts of Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd11 need not concern us.12 The 
House of Lords recognised the principle of unjust enrichment and held 
that it required the recognition of a change of position defence. Lord 
Goff gave the key judgment. 
In Lord Goff’s view, the law should give the recipient of a mistaken 
payment a defence when the recipient’s position:13
is so changed that he will suffer an injustice if called upon to repay or 
to repay in full, the injustice of requiring him so to repay outweighs the 
injustice of denying the [payer recovery]. 
As indicated by this extract, Lord Goff discusses the defence at a 
high level of generality, and I should say that he went on to say that he 
deliberately did this to enable it to develop on a “case by case basis”.14 But 
he gave some guidance; for example, mere spending of the payment is not 
enough.15 Rather, the payment must have encouraged the recipient to do 
something with their money that they would not otherwise have done. 
The illustration Lord Goff gave was a donation to a charity that would 
not otherwise have been made.16 He also noted that the defence was 
10 Since Kelly v Solari, above n 7, the courts have expanded the types of 
mistake for which relief is available. But the legal principle from Kelly v 
Solari remains good law. The payer’s carelessness in making the payment 
does not preclude recovery.
11 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 (HL).
12 In essence the case involved a claim to recover stolen money that had been 
gambled at a gaming club. While not involving a mistaken payment, the 
claim was “founded upon the unjust enrichment of the club” (at 578 per 
Lord Goff) and in developing the change of position defence Lord Goff 






restricted to recipients who had acted in good faith.17 By this he meant 
that the defence is not available to a recipient who spends the money 
knowing of the “facts entitling the [payer] to [recover their payment]”.18
Clearly to the extent the defence applies, the payer’s ability to recover 
their mistaken payment is reduced. So the defence operates to reduce the 
protection Kelly v Solari affords a careless payer against the consequences 
of their own carelessness.
II Relative Fault
In Lipkin Gorman, Lord Goff said nothing about relative fault. But, as I 
noted earlier, the orthodox common law view is that it is not relevant. I 
believe that this remains the position due to the influence of the late Peter 
Birks.19 At the time of his death in 2004, Peter was the Regius Professor of 
Civil Law at the University of Oxford. His work culminated in what has 
become the dominant common law theory explaining unjust enrichment, 
its claims and its defences. 
You will recall that in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd Lord Goff referred 
to injustice in making the recipient repay as a justification for the change 
of position defence.20 Some believe that injustice is too general a basis 
and invites uncertainty.21 In response, narrower bases, such as protecting 
the recipient’s autonomy and security of receipt, have been advanced.22 
Birks suggests that the defence is best understood as a “disenrichment” 
defence (his words), in that it responds simply to the good faith loss of 
the enrichment.23
The Birksian “disenrichment” defence
In the mid-1980s Birks first advanced a theory to explain why and when 
a court should regard a defendant as being unjustly enriched.24 As all 
17 At 579.
18 At 580.
19 In Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income Group Litigation v 
Commisioner of Inland Revenue [2012] UKSC 19, [2012] 3 All ER 909 at 
[17] Lord Hope referred to Birks as “[o]ne of the most distinguished and 
influential scholars” working in this area.
20 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd, above n 11, at 579. At 580 Lord Goff also 
asked whether it would be inequitable to require repayment. 
21 Similar observations have been made about the proposed use of the term 
“inequitable”. See Gareth Jones “Some Thoughts on Change of Position” 
in Andrew Burrows and Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (eds) Mapping the Law: 
Essays in Memory of Peter Birks (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) 65 
at 79.
22 For a review of various rationales that have been advanced, see Elise Bant 
The Change of Position Defence (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2009) at 211–218.
23 Peter Birks Unjust Enrichment (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2005) at 208–219. See also Andrew Burrows “Change of Position: The 
View from England” (2003) 36 Loy LA L Rev 803 at 803.
24 Peter Birks An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (revised paperback ed, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989).
Mistaken Payments and the Change of Position Defence
Otago Law Review650 (2012) Vol 12 No 4
theories do, it attracted critical analysis. One concern was that the theory 
attempted to apply unjust enrichment to cases that others believed should 
be analysed under different legal principles. In response, Birks narrowed 
the range of situations in which he suggested unjust enrichment applied.25 
This also enabled him to suggest that unjust enrichment operated quite 
independently of other legal principles.
Birks achieved this by suggesting that Kelly v Solari (our mistaken 
payment case) is a core case for unjust enrichment.26 For him it illustrates 
two definitive characteristics of an unjust enrichment claim. These are:
First: the imposition of strict liability upon the recipient irrespective of 
their good faith;27 and 
Second: the irrelevance of the claimant’s carelessness in conferring the 
enrichment.28
According to Birks, claims that did not display these characteristics were 
not and could not be unjust enrichment claims.
Birks recognised that strict liability may result in “cruel”,29 “almost 
intolerable”30 results, to use his words. Against this background, the role 
of the disenrichment defence was to “dra[w] the sting”31 of strict liability 
and the apparent cruelty of Kelly v Solari. Birks argued:32 
Strict … liability only becomes intolerable after and to the extent of 
disenrichment – that is, once the enrichment has been used up, so that 
repayment would leave the recipient with less than he would have had 
25 In essence, Birks advanced a new classificatory scheme for English 
private law rights, pursuant to which he suggested that legal rights 
should be classified according to the causative event from which they 
arise: from “manifestations of consent”; from “unjust enrichments”; from 
“miscellaneous other events” (which he referred to as not-wrongs); and 
from “wrongs”. Birks also distanced the causative event from the remedy. 
See generally Peter Birks “Misnomer” in WR Cornish and others (eds) 
Restitution: Past, Present and Future – Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 1998) 1 at 8; Peter Birks “Definition and Division: 
A Mediation on Institutes 3.13” in Peter Birks (ed) The Classification 
of Obligations (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) 1 at 32–33; Peter Birks 
“Rights, Wrongs and Remedies” (2000) 20 OJLS 1 at 1; and Birks Unjust 
Enrichment, above n 23, at 20–46. 
26 Birks Unjust Enrichment, above n 23, at 3 (“The law of unjust enrichment 
is the law of all events materially identical to the mistaken payment of a 
non-existent debt”).
27 At 7. See also Peter Birks “The Role of Fault in the Law of Unjust 
Enrichment” in GH Jones and WJ Swadling (eds) The Search for Principle: 
Essays in Honour of Lord Goff of Chieveley (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1999) 235. 
28 Birks Unjust Enrichment, above n 23, at 6.






if he had never received the unjust enrichment.
Birks also sought symmetry for his theory. By this I mean that he believed 
that the characteristics that define an unjust enrichment claim define also 
an unjust enrichment defence.33 So since the payer’s carelessness was not 
relevant to the claim, Birks believed it was not relevant to the defence.
Despite the focus on the loss of the enrichment, Birks agreed with 
Lord Goff that a recipient’s bad faith should disqualify them from the 
defence. Concerned that bad faith could be expanded to encompass 
careless behaviour, and so undermine the symmetry between claim and 
defence, Birks stressed that carelessness is not bad faith:34 
[I]t would appear intolerable to any [recipient] disqualified [from the 
disenrichment defence] for negligence [carelessness] that the claimant’s 
claim should continue to be unaffected by his negligence.
Birks also argued that any consideration of the recipient’s carelessness 
would bring unpredictability:35 
If … a careless but honest recipient were disqualified from the defence 
of change of position, the law would have to face the question why 
carelessness on the other side should not also be taken into account. … 
[A court] which goes down that path involves itself in an impossibly 
embarrassing and unpredictable exercise …. 
Birks’ theory has not gained much traction in the US. There, a 
consideration of relative fault is an integral part of a change of position 
defence or, as they call it, the change of circumstances defence.
The American Law Institute change of circumstances defence
First, what is the American Law Institute (ALI)? There are 50 states 
in the US and their laws differ. The ALI promotes consistency. It is 
comprised of leading US lawyers, judges, and professors and it publishes 
“Restatements” as to what its members believe the law should be. 
Restatements are influential, and not just in the US.
The US recognition of unjust enrichment pre-dates that of England and 
New Zealand. Indeed, in 1936 the ALI approved a Restatement analysing 
and applying this principle.36 That Restatement advanced the following 
change of position defence: 
§ 142 Change of Circumstances
33 Peter Birks “Change of Position: The Two Central Questions” (2004) 120 
LQR 373 at 378 (“What to do when the enrichment has been used up 
or otherwise lost is a secondary or incidental problem which has to be 
seen and solved in the context of that primary mission [the imposition 
of liability]”).
34 Birks Unjust Enrichment, above n 23, at 212.
35 Birks “The Role of Fault in the Law of Unjust Enrichment”, above n 27, 
at 253. See also Birks Unjust Enrichment, above n 23, at 214.
36 American Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Restitution: Quasi Contracts 
and Constructive Trusts (St Paul, Minnesota, 1936). 
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(1) The right of a person to restitution [ie recovery] from another 
because of a benefit received is terminated or diminished if, after 
the receipt of the benefit, circumstances have so changed that it 
would be inequitable to require the other to make full restitution.
(2) Change of circumstances may be a defense or a partial defense if 
… [the recipient] was no more at fault for his receipt, retention or 
dealing with the subject matter than was the claimant.
(3)  … 
You will note that by using broad concepts upon which to establish the 
defence subs (1) adopts a similar approach to that of Lord Goff in Lipkin 
Gorman. For the purposes of this lecture the key subsection is subs (2) 
and its reference to fault. 
In 2011 a new Restatement was published37 – in substance it follows 
the approach of §142.38 Tonight I have displayed §142 from the 1936 
Restatement, because it predates Lipkin Gorman and was referred to by 
Lord Goff.39 But I will refer to passages from the 2011 Restatement to 
show the continuation of underlying policy considerations.
Despite §142’s reference to fault, the ALI adopts a similar starting point 
to Kelly v Solari – that the payer’s carelessness is irrelevant, at least while 
the recipient remains enriched:40 
The claimant [payer] in a mistaken-payment case has often been negligent; 
the recipient is typically blameless. Liability is initially imposed without 
reference to this comparison, because (but only so long as) the recipient 
is not being asked to bear any loss.
So the ALI is saying that the payer’s carelessness is irrelevant provided 
the recipient has not changed their position. You will have noted that the 
ALI refers to loss. In this context “loss” refers to the amount by which 
the recipient has factually changed their position. To use Lord Goff’s 
example of a one-off payment to a charity, this payment is a loss of the 
original enrichment. 
The ALI sees unjust enrichment as underlying the imposition of liability 
and governing the initial operation of the defence:41
The liability of an innocent recipient must be net of any loss sustained 
as a result of the transaction for which the claimant [the payer] seeks 
37 American Law Institute Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment 
(3rd ed, St Paul, Minnesota, 2011).
38 In the 2011 Restatement, §65 creates the defence and, in so doing, 
incorporates various qualifications established by other sections. So, 
for example, §52 performs a similar function to §142(2) of the 1936 
Restatement by providing a mechanism by which the comparative fault 
of the payer and recipient is evaluated.
39 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd, above n 11, at 579.
40 Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, above n 37, at §65 cmnt 
a.
41 At §65 cmnt h.
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restitution, if liability is to be justified in terms of unjust enrichment. 
But the ALI theorises that the loss of the enrichment is just one 
prerequisite for the defence. In addition the loss must be attributed to 
the actions of the payer:42 
A detrimental change of position transforms the situation [with its 
enrichment focus]. Unlike the simple mistaken-payment scenario, the 
overall transaction now involves an economic loss that one of the parties 
must bear. The law of restitution [unjust enrichment], like the law of torts, 
assigns losses on the basis of fault. 
As perceived by the ALI, the defence acts to “reallocate [the] loss [of the 
enrichment] from the [innocent] recipient to the [mistaken payer]”.43 
Since this loss is to be assigned on the basis of fault, the ALI requires a 
court to assess each parties’ actions. The aim is to identify the party most 
responsible for the loss. For the defence to be available (with the result 
that the payer bares the loss) the payer must be more responsible for the 
loss than the recipient. Typically the recipient will have changed their 
position in good faith and without any carelessness. In this situation, the 
ALI reasons that the payer’s carelessness in making the payment means 
they are responsible for the loss and the defence applies.
The ALI is using a different reasoning process than that used by Birks. 
But the same result can eventuate. For example, faced with a good faith 
non-careless recipient who has changed their position, both the ALI 
and Birks impose the consequences of the loss upon the careless payer. 
In contrast, the different reasoning process does produce different 
results when the acts of the good faith recipient are such that they bear 
greater responsibility for either the payment or the subsequent loss of 
the enrichment. Here the ALI reasons that the recipient remains strictly 
liability.
A summary may be useful: the ALI’s defence provides an important 
contrast with Birks’ disenrichment defence. Birks suggests that 
the operation of the defence is governed by the principle of unjust 
enrichment, which in this context is concerned only with good faith 
disenrichment. In contrast, the ALI recognises that the cause of the 
disenrichment (or loss) is relevant, with the result that the principle of 
unjust enrichment interacts with other concerns.
The Judicature Act 1908, s 94B
In 1958, forty years or so before Lipkin Gorman, the New Zealand 
Parliament recognised the need for a change of position defence. The 
result was an insertion into the Judicature Act 1908 of a new defence – s 
94B. I now turn to consider briefly the operation of this defence. For the 
purposes of this lecture the key phrases in this section are:
Relief … in respect of any payment made under mistake, … shall be denied 
42 At §65 cmnt a.
43 At §65 cmnt h.
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wholly or in part if the person from whom relief is sought received the 
payment in good faith and has so altered his position in reliance on the 
validity of the payment that in the opinion of the Court, having regard 
to all possible implications in respect of other persons, it is inequitable 
to grant relief, or to grant relief in full, as the case may be.
Section 94B shares similarities with the other conceptions of the 
defence, so, for example, the recipient must act in good faith. But there 
are differences. A key difference is that in Thomas v Houston Corbett & 
Co,44 the Court of Appeal concluded that s 94B “entitle[s the court] to 
look at the equities from the point of view of both sides [the payer and 
the recipient]”;45 to “balanc[e] the[se equities];46 and then to apportion 
“responsibility” for the alteration in position.47 In this summary I am 
using the words of the judges.
So s 94B is similar to the ALI’s defence in recognising the importance of 
relative fault. But unlike the ALI, s 94B uses relative fault as a mechanism 
to apportion the loss between payer and recipient. 
III New Zealand’s Controversial Cases 
Thomas v Houston Corbett & Co
Dr Thomas is a young surgeon. He has £400 to invest. He sees a Mr Cook 
– a law clerk employed by Houston Corbett. Thomas may have thought 
that that he was investing his money through Houston Corbett but the 
trial court found that he lent his money to Cook. Cook is a rogue (and 
as we shall see, a skilful one).
A few months later, Thomas seeks repayment. Cook alters the trust 
account records to indicate that Thomas is entitled to about £1,381. A 
trust account cheque for this amount is drawn in Thomas’s favour and 
deposited into his bank account. Cook sees Thomas; tells him of the 
payment; tells him that £541 of it represents repayment of the loan plus 
interest; and that the balance – some £840 – belongs to other clients of 
the firm. So Thomas knows that he is not entitled to £840 of the payment. 
At Cook’s request, Thomas gives him his cheque for £840, believing that 
Cook will use it to pay those who are entitled to it. Cook pockets the 
cheque. 
Houston Corbett & Co discovers its mistake and seeks recovery. 
Thomas acknowledges liability to repay the £541 he retained, but argues 
that s 94B applies with respect to the £840 he on-paid to Cook.
The Court of Appeal concluded that Thomas was “unsophisticated”;48 
44 Thomas v Houston Corbett & Co, above n 4. 
45 At 164 per North P. See also at 170 per Turner J (to “examin[e] … the 
competing equities of the parties”).
46 At 165 per North P.
47 At 178 per McGregor J. See also at 165 per North P and at 171 per Turner 
J.
48 At 165 per North P.
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that he had been “unduly trusting”;49 perhaps “undoubtedly foolish”50 
in his dealings with Cook. But it also considered that Houston Corbett 
bore more responsibility. Cook was a “trusted” employee,51 held out 
to others as being “honest and trustworthy”.52 Additionally, Houston 
Corbett was in a better position to judge Cook’s character and, given 
his access to client funds, there is some suggestion that it should have 
investigated his mode of living.53 In any event Houston Corbett had 
given Cook access to the trust account records.54
Remember that Thomas was seeking to apply the defence for the £840 
he had on-paid to Cook. The Court of Appeal concluded that Thomas 
would be relieved of liability for two-thirds of this sum.55
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd v Waitaki International Processing 
(NI)	Ltd	
This is the second of New Zealand’s controversial cases and, as we 
will soon see, the more controversial of the two. National Bank of New 
Zealand Ltd v Waitaki International Processing (NI) Ltd56 involves a mistaken 
payment by a bank. I will refer to Waitaki as the recipient, but the actual 
recipient was another company subsequently acquired by Waitaki.
The mid-1980s saw the relaxation of controls on overseas currency 
transactions. Many organisations, Waitaki included, started trading 
foreign currencies. In June 1986, Waitaki purchased USD 500,000 from 
the Bank. But the Bank debited Waitaki’s US dollar account, rather than 
crediting it. Waitaki complained and the Bank corrected the entry, but it 
took some time to correct its own account with Lloyds Bank in the US, 
from which it had sourced the US dollars. 
Because of this delay, the Bank comes to believe that it still holds USD 
500,000 for Waitaki. For about three months the Bank tries to pay Waitaki, 
but Waitaki denies the money is theirs. In about October 1986 Waitaki 
49 At 170 per Turner J.
50 At 178 per McGregor J.
51 At 170 per Turner J.
52 At 177 per McGregor J.
53 At 165 per North P.
54 At 177 per McGregor J.
55 Because the Court of Appeal apportioned the £840 loss between Houston 
Corbett and Thomas, this result differs from the predicted result applying 
both the Birksian and the ALI tests – that Thomas should have a defence 
for the full £840. Commenting upon the case, Birks believed that Thomas 
acted in good faith when he paid Cook the £840. So, according to Birks, 
Thomas should have had a defence for that amount. See Birks Unjust 
Enrichment, above n 23, at 216. Similar reasoning would apply to the Lipkin 
Gorman defence. In contrast the ALI would reach this result on the basis 
that Houston Corbett & Co bore greater fault.
56 National Bank of New Zealand Ltd v Waitaki International Processing (NI) Ltd, 
above n 5. The judgment of the High Court contains a detailed analysis 
of the facts. See National Bank of New Zealand Ltd v Waitaki International 
Processing (NI) Ltd [1997] 1 NZLR 724 (HC).
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relents but it keeps the payment separate, placing it on term deposit 
with a finance company.
In late 1987 the Bank discovers its mistake but delays seeking 
repayment until June 1988. And it was not until January 1990 that the 
Bank had fully reconciled its records. Meanwhile the deposit matures, 
and is reinvested. Originally the finance company gave government 
stock as security but this changed to be a mortgage over a commercial 
property. In June 1989 the finance company is placed into liquidation, 
and the new security is discovered to be worthless.
Waitaki argues that it had changed its position. Its argument based on 
s 94B of the Judicature Act 1908, however, is unsuccessful. By a majority, 
the members of the Court hold that since Waitaki knew or suspected that 
the payment was a mistake, the deposit with the finance company was 
not made in reliance on the validity of the payment.57 It will be recalled 
that s 94B requires that the recipient of the payment “has so altered his 
position in reliance on the validity of the payment that in the opinion of the 
Court … it is inequitable to grant relief”.58
But all the members of the Court agreed that the defence recognised in 
Lipkin Gorman was part of our law and that Waitaki’s knowledge did not 
preclude its operation.59 All three members of the Court also held that 
the “balancing of the equities” approach identified in Thomas v Houston 
Corbett & Co in the context of s 94B applied to the Lipkin Gorman defence.60 
Indeed, Thomas J, echoing the views of the ALI, observed that the change 
of position defence is about loss allocation, and that the court should 
have regard to the parties’ “respective responsibility for the loss”.61 
The Court proceeded to affirm the Trial Court’s finding that both the 
Bank and Waitaki were responsible for the loss: the Bank 90 per cent; 
Waitaki 10 per cent.62
There is one last case I want to consider briefly – a Privy Council case 
in which Lord Goff and Lord Bingham implicitly criticised the approach 
of our courts for apportioning responsibility for the loss.
Dextra Bank & Trust Co Ltd v Bank of Jamaica 
Like National Bank of New Zealand Ltd v Waitaki International Processing 
(NI) Ltd, Dextra Bank & Trust Co Ltd v Bank of Jamaica63 arose out of the 
57 At 227, 231–232 (compare the dissent of Henry J at 217–218).
58 Emphasis added.
59 At 227–228, 232.
60 At 220–221, 229–230, 232–233.
61 At 229.
62 Birks agreed that Waitaki acted in good faith. See Birks Unjust Enrichment, 
above n 23, at 217. The predicted result applying the Lipkin Gorman and 
Birksian tests is that Waitaki would have a full defence. As it happens 
this is the same predicted result for the ALI test – just because the bank 
was found to be more at fault.
63 Dextra Bank & Trust Co Ltd v Bank of Jamaica [2001] UKPC 50, [2002] 1 All 
ER (Comm) 193.
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relaxation of foreign exchange controls. But unlike Waitaki it involved 
fraud. The Bank of Jamaica used agents to identify vendors of foreign 
currency. Some of these agents initiated a scam in which they approached 
Dextra and, purporting to act on behalf of the Bank, sought a short-term 
loan of about USD 3,000,000. On acquiring Dextra’s cheque which was 
payable to the Bank of Jamaica, the fraudsters misled the Bank into 
believing that the transaction was a sale of US dollars for Jamaican 
dollars. The Bank of Jamaica paid the Jamaican dollars to the fraudsters, 
who, of course, pocketed the money.
When the scam was discovered, Dextra sought recovery from the Bank 
of Jamaica. One of its arguments was that it was mistaken as to the nature 
of the transaction and, for that reason, its payment should be regarded as 
a mistaken one. Dextra also argued that the Bank of Jamaica should have 
no change of position defence in respect of its payment to the fraudsters 
as it (the Bank) was at fault for being taken in by the scam.
Dextra’s claim was unsuccessful. For reasons that need not concern 
us, their Lordships held that Dextra was not legally mistaken when it 
made the payment. As a result it was unnecessary for them to consider 
Dextra’s fault argument, but they did. First they found that Dextra was 
more at fault.64 They also rejected the argument that a court should assess 
the parties’ relative fault (or carelessness):65
[M]ost reluctant to recognise the propriety of introducing the concept of 
relative fault … and indeed decline to do so. … [G]ood faith on the part 
of the recipient [i]s a sufficient requirement … . [M]uch influenced by 
Kelly v Solari … It seems very strange that … the [recipient] should find 
his conduct examined to ascertain whether he had been negligent, and 
still more so that the [payer’s] conduct should likewise be examined for 
the purposes of assessing the relative fault of the parties. 
…
Agree with Birks, “that the New Zealand courts have shown how 
hopelessly unstable the defence [of change of position] becomes when 
it is used to reflect relative fault. Certainly, in the case of Thomas, the 
reader has the impression of judges struggling manfully to control and 
to contain an alien concept.” 
These passages appear to support two arguments raised by Birks. First, 
that any consideration of relative fault is contrary to Kelly v Solari. And 
second, the risk of unpredictability. Another argument, of course, is that 
relative fault is inconsistent with Birksian theory.
So, is the approach of our Court of Appeal in Thomas v Houston Corbett 
& Co and then in National Bank of New Zealand Ltd v Waitaki International 
64 At [41] (“the fault of Dextra [in being taken in by the scam] greatly 
outweighed the fault, if any, of the Bank of Jamaica”, per Lord Bingham 
and Lord Goff).
65 At [45] per Lord Bingham and Lord Goff.
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Processing (NI) Ltd inconsistent with common law principles and best 
forgotten?
IV The Way Forward
Consistency with Kelly v Solari
Kelly v Solari is a core case in determining the common law’s response 
to mistaken payments. At the very least it establishes that a recipient of 
a mistaken payment cannot justify keeping it simply because the payer 
was careless with their own money.66 But I am going to argue that it does 
not establish that carelessness is never relevant.
Kelly v Solari was not considered in Lipkin Gorman. Prior to Dextra 
Bank & Trust Co Ltd v Bank of Jamaica one might argue that Lipkin Gorman 
implicitly qualifies Kelly v Solari. The argument is that the reasoning in 
Kelly v Solari applies only so long as the recipient remains enriched. So 
once the recipient ceases to be enriched the payer’s carelessness in making 
the payment may become relevant. This is close to the ALI’s approach. 
But Dextra appears to confirm that the payer’s carelessness in making 
the payment is not relevant, whether or not the enrichment remains.
Again this does not mean that carelessness is never relevant. I believe 
that the crucial fact in Kelly v Solari is that the payer was careless in making 
the payment. The facts of the case did not involve a consideration of the 
payer’s acts after the payment. Neither did the facts in Dextra Bank & 
Trust Co Ltd v Bank of Jamaica.
Cases involving post-payment acts of carelessness by the payer will 
be rare. Typically the payer’s only post-payment act is to demand 
repayment. But I believe that Thomas v Houston Corbett & Co can be viewed 
as a rare case where, after making the payment, the payer does take some 
additional action that encourages the recipient to change their position.67
Remember that Cook practiced his deceptions on a number of 
occasions. One occasion was when Cook misrepresented to Houston 
Corbett & Co its liability to Thomas. This resulted in the payment. Kelly 
v Solari tells us that the carelessness of Houston Corbett & Co in making 
this payment is not relevant. Thomas is strictly liable to repay, subject 
to defences.
Another situation of deception was when Cook advises Thomas of 
the payment, and requests the £840 payment. A reason Thomas believes 
Cook’s request is his position in Houston Corbett & Co; he is also 
encouraged by Houston Corbett holding Cook out as an “honest and 
66 Peter Watts “Restitution” [1999] NZLR 373 at 379–380. “[A]ll that Kelly v 
Solari does is to prevent an enriched [recipient] from saying: ‘I am allowed 
to keep your money because you are plainly rather careless with it’”.)
67 In rare cases, where in response to the recipient’s enquiry, the payer 
confirms the recipient’s entitlement to the payment, the payer may be 
estopped from seeking recovery.
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trustworthy” employee.68 So, independently of its mistaken payment, 
Houston Corbett & Co enables Cook to make his request more believable. 
I believe that this justified the court in imposing some responsibility 
upon Houston Corbett & Co for the loss of this money. 
My point is that there is a difference between the payer’s carelessness 
in making the payment (which Kelly v Solari states is not relevant) and 
post-payment acts by the payer, which encourages the recipient to do 
something with the payment (in respect of which Kelly v Solari does not 
consider, as its facts did not raise this point).
Thomas v Houston Corbett & Co also illustrates that the recipient may be 
careless. Thomas contributed to his own misfortune. He knew the £840 
was not his and he was too trusting of Cook when he paid it to him; the 
Court of Appeal would say carelessly so. So Thomas should bare some 
responsibility.69 
Cases of carelessness by a good faith recipient will be rare; perhaps 
they are limited to the situation where the recipient knows or suspects 
that they are not entitled to the payment. 
In National Bank of New Zealand Ltd v Waitaki International Processing 
(NI) Ltd, the High Court found that Waitaki was careless in failing to 
monitor the adequacy of the replacement security.70 More problematic 
is whether the Bank was careless post-payment. A key consideration 
for the High Court (and noted by Henry J in the Court of Appeal as a 
“significant factor telling against the bank”)71 was the considerable delay 
between the mistaken payment, the Bank’s discovery of the mistake, 
and the Bank’s confirmation of the mistake. It will be recalled that the 
finance company failed during this period. It may be that in the eyes of 
the Court, the delay constituted careless behaviour. But views may differ.
To recap, my point is that Kelly v Solari precludes a consideration of 
the payer’s carelessness in making the payment, not post-payment acts.
Consistency with Birksian Theory
Birksian theory has two fundamental objections to any consideration 
68 Thomas v Houston Corbett & Co, above n 4, at 177 per McGregor J.
69 English courts have that held that the behaviour of a good faith recipient 
may be a relevant and that this is consistent with Dextra Bank & Trust Co 
Ltd v Bank of Jamaica, above n 63. An illustration of this is Commerzbank 
AG v Price-Jones [2003] EWCA Civ 1663, 147 SJLB 1397 at [82] per 
Munby J. (“[Dextra’s condemnation of relative fault] does not mean that 
the court is required to blind itself to the fact, if fact it be, that someone 
seeking to make good the defence of change of position has only himself 
to blame for his predicament, having acted on a view which is not 
merely erroneous but which, moreover, fails to meet the standard of the 
reasonable man”). 
70 National Bank of New Zealand Ltd v Waitaki International Processing (NI) Ltd 
(HC), above n 56, at 733.
71 National Bank of New Zealand Ltd v Waitaki International Processing (NI) Ltd, 
above n 5, at 222.
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of relative fault. You will recall that Birks sought symmetry between 
unjust enrichment claims and defences; so the first objection is that if 
carelessness is not relevant for the claim, it cannot be relevant for the 
defence. The second objection is based on the premise that the principle 
of unjust enrichment is self-contained or exclusive, by which I mean that 
only concerns recognised within that principle are relevant.
The importance of symmetry and exclusivity for Birksian theory is 
displayed by Birks’ response to National Bank of New Zealand Ltd v Waitaki 
International Processing (NI) Ltd. You may be surprised to learn that Birks 
believed that the Court was correct to evaluate Waitaki’s actions.72 Of 
course this is contrary to his theory. So Birks argued that the Bank had 
two independent claims – first, an unjust enrichment claim, subject to 
defences, for the recovery of the mistaken payment. And second, a claim 
for a breach of a duty to protect the mistaken payment against loss, a 
duty that Birks believed should be imposed upon Waitaki because of its 
knowledge.73 So, for Birks, Waitaki’s actions in depositing the money 
with the finance company and failing to monitor the security are not 
relevant for the change of position defence, but are relevant for a duty 
of care claim.
Does the law have to recognise a new claim against Waitaki? I would 
suggest “no”, and that by encouraging this Birks is motivated to defend 
his theory against a case in which the court perceives a more sophisticated 
view of unjust enrichment and its interaction with other legal principles.74
At this point I want to share a warning Lord Goff made in a public 
lecture. This was the 1983 Maccabean Lecture in Jurisprudence. In his 
lecture Lord Goff discusses the formulation and development of legal 
principle. He suggests that a pitfall confronting those who “seek to state 
legal principles” is “the temptation of elegance”:75
[T]he temptation of elegance … is a temptation which can attract us all, 
simply because a solution, if elegant, automatically carries a degree of 
credibility; and yet the law has to reflect life in all its untidy complexity, 
and we have constantly to be on our guard against stating principles in 
terms which do not allow for the possibility of qualifications or exceptions 
as yet unperceived.
Lord Goff proceeded to discuss the “beneficial influence of facts [of 
72 Birks Unjust Enrichment, above n 23, at 216–217.
73 Peter Birks “A Bank’s Mistaken Payments: Two Recent Cases and Their 
Implications” (2000) 6 NZBLQ 155 at 164; Birks Unjust Enrichment, above 
n 23, at 216.
74 See Charles Mitchell, Paul Mitchell and Stephen Watterson (eds) Goff and 
Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (8th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
2011) at 1-09 (recognising that overriding legal principle may justify an 
the finding of an enrichment yet override the granting of relief).
75 Lord Goff “The Search for Principle” (Maccabean Lecture in Jurisprudence, 
1983) republished in GH Jones and WJ Swadling (eds) The Search for 
Principle: Essays in Honour of Lord Goff of Chieveley (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1999) 313 at 318.
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a case] upon the [development of the] law”.76 He noted how judges’ 
perception of the law is “strongly influenced by the facts of a particular 
case” and how legal principle adapts to reflect this.77
This process can be seen at work with the change of position defence. 
As I noted earlier, in Lipkin Gorman Lord Goff stated that that he was 
mindful not to “inhibit the development of the defence on a case by case 
basis”.78 And since then the defence has developed in ways Lord Goff may 
not have anticipated. For example, in a later case Lord Goff held that the 
change of position could precede the receipt of the enrichment.79 Courts 
have also recognised that the recipient need not initiate the change; it is 
enough that their position is changed for them, for example by a thief.
Birksian theory is instrumental in developing our understanding of the 
law, but I suggest that Birks’ response to the Waitaki case illustrates that 
the symmetry and exclusivity he sought may be more a manifestation 
of an elegant theory than a theory reflecting a work-in-progress judge-
made response to the influence of rare facts.80
Having raised the importance of the case law, I must respond to Lord 
Goff’s criticism of relative fault in the Dextra case. I have two responses. 
First, it will be recalled that their Lordships found that Dextra (the payer) 
had been the more careless party and that this carelessness arose in 
making the payment. So their Lordships could have been responding 
to what they saw as a request to overturn Kelly v Solari.
Second, even if we take their observations at face value, I agree with 
Professor Andrew Burrows of Oxford University, that they also assume 
a symmetry between the claim and the defence that is not convincing:81 
Strict liability [to repay a mistaken payment] goes hand-in-glove with 
unjust enrichment. But the issue of change of position rests on the 
defendant [recipient] having been disenriched and it is hard to see why 
the same considerations as to fault [which apply to the initial imposition 
of strict liability] should necessarily apply in relation to that issue [the 
change of position defence] …. 
These observations apply equally to Birksian theory.
Defences take different forms. Some operate as denials, by which I 
mean that they deny the existence of the claim: ie, I didn’t receive the 
76 At 325.
77 At 325.
78 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd, above n 11, at 580.
79 Dextra Bank & Trust Co Ltd v Bank of Jamaica, above n 63. 
80 Commentators agree that cases such as Thomas v Houston Corbett & Co and 
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd v Waitaki International Processing (NI) Ltd 
will be rare. See, for example, Birks “A Bank’s Mistaken Payments: Two 
Recent Cases and Their Implications”, above n 73, at 163; Jones, above n 
21, at 80; John D McCamus “Rethinking Section 142 of the Restatement 
of Restitution: Fault, Bad Faith, and Change of Position” (2008) 65 Wash 
& Lee L Rev 889 at 929. 
81 Burrows, above n 23, at 819.
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payment or, as in Dextra Bank & Trust Co Ltd v Bank of Jamaica, the payer 
was not legally mistaken.
Defences can also be affirmative, by which I mean that the claim is 
acknowledged but a new matter is raised that negates it or deprives it 
of its normal consequences. For this reason, such defences have to be 
specially pleaded. In this context an illustration is the good consideration 
defence recognised by Goff J, as he then was, in a 1980s case.82 This 
enables the recipient to concede that the payer acted under a legally 
relevant mistake, but to deny any obligation to repay on the basis that 
the recipient was legally owed the money.83 
The point is that affirmative defences can raise different policy 
considerations than those that are present in the initial claim. The change 
of position defence is an affirmative defence. Typically it operates to see 
if the loss of the enrichment arose by virtue of what the law regards as a 
change of position; but the ALI and our Court of Appeal in National Bank 
of New Zealand Ltd v Waitaki International Processing (NI) Ltd recognise 
that once the loss of enrichment is legally established, issues of loss 
allocation may arise.
Unpredictability
The fear is that consideration of relative fault will bring unpredictability. 
I believe that this fear is exaggerated. Courts evaluate actions on a 
regular basis. The key factor is that the courts know what actions they 
are assessing and why. 
Conclusion
In my introduction I raised the questions, whether the actions of a 
mistaken payer and a good faith recipient should ever be evaluated in 
determining the amount of recipient’s liability. Kelly v Solari establishes 
that the payer’s carelessness in making the payment is not relevant. I am 
not questioning this. Hopefully, I have persuaded you that neither Kelly 
v Solari nor Birksian theory precludes a consideration of the payer’s post-
payment actions, nor, in appropriate cases, the actions of the recipient.
In the vast majority of cases no consideration of the parties’ actions will 
be required, just because there will no qualifying acts. Apart from the 
payment itself the payer will have undertaken no acts that encourage the 
recipient to change their position. And the recipient will have believed 
in good faith that the payment was theirs and acted accordingly. But 
Thomas v Houston Corbett & Co and National Bank of New Zealand Ltd v 
Waitaki International Processing (NI) Ltd illustrate rare situations where 
good faith is too general a test, and an evaluation of the post-payment 
acts of one or both of the parties may be necessary.
82 Barclays Bank Ltd v W J Simms Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd, above n 9, at 
695–696.
83 At 696.
